Republic of the Philippines vs. Villaser 54 SCRA 83
WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE CAN BE SUED WITHOUT ITS CONSENT, EXCEPTIONS;
FACTS:
On July 3, 1971, a decision was rendered in
Special Proceedings in favor of respondents PJ Kiener Co. Ltd., Gavino Unchuan,
and International Construction Corp., and against the petitioner herein,
confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P 1,712,396.40, subject of
Special Proceedings.
On June 24, 1969, respondent Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor issued an Order
declaring the aforestated decision final and executory, directing the Sheriffs
of Rizal Province, Quezon City as well as Manila to execute the decision. The
corresponding Alia Writ of Execution was issued. On the strength of the
aforementioned Alias Writ of Execution, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served
notices of garnishment with several banks specially on the monies due to the
AFP in the form of deposits sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the
said Writ.
The deposits of the banks are public funds duly appropriated and
allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of
military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the AFP.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the state can be sued
without its consent.
RULING:
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the
juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is
immune from suit unless it gives its consent.
A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception
or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be
no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends. A continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suablitity is not to be
deplored for as against the inconvenience that may cause private parties, the
loss of government efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious
functions are far greater is such a fundamental principle were abandoned and
the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted.
The State may not be sued without its consent. Public funds cannot be
the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been
previously granted and the state liability adjudged. The universal rule that
where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by
general or special law, it may limit claimant’s action only up to the
completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the power
of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy
such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding
appropriation as required by the law.
Money in the hands of public officers, although it may be due
government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the
process of garnishment. One reason is, the State, by virtue of its sovereignty,
may not be sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the
Legislature, and to subject its officers
to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly.
Another reason is that money’s sought to be garnished, as long as they remain
in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter,
although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion
thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that
every consideration of public policy forbids it.
The Supreme Court granted the writs of certiorari and prohibition,
while nullifying and setting aside both the order declaring the decision s
executor as well as the alia writ of execution issued.
It was ruled that public funds cannot be the object of garnishment
proceedings even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and even
if the State liability had been adjudged. The universal rule that where the
State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or
special law, it may limit claimant's action only up to the completion of
proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of the Courts
ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may
not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements
of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required
by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be
allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from
their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
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